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 When two individual actors negotiate repeatedly over time, some sort of M social 
relationship is likely to develop. Sometimes the relationship is remote, distant, and hostile; 
sometimes it is open, close, and friendly; most often it falls somewhere between these 
possibilities. The relationship that develops is likely to be contingent on the social context giving 
rise to negotiations in the first place, the strategic action people adopt in response to that context, 
and the results they produce jointly. In this chapter, we suggest how one part of the social 
context—the structurally based power of individual actors—affects the relationship developed in 
repeated explicit negotiations. 
 The social context we assume is a network in which each of two focal actors has at least 
one alternative negotiation partner. This might be termed a minimal "exchange network” 
consisting of a four-position line. Each actor can exchange with only one of the others at any 
point in time, which makes it a negatively connected exchange network, in Cook and Emerson's 
(1978; Cook, Emerson, Gilmore, & Yamagishi, 1983; Emerson, 1972) terms. Many 
interorganizational buyer-seller relations, international trading relations, and even close personal 
relations have the properties of such an exchange network. Social exchange theory treats the 
nature (i.e., expected value) of prospective agreements from an alternative actor as a structural 
dimension of each actor's potential power or dependence on another (Emerson, 1972, 1981; 
Thibaut & Kelley, 1959).Previous research on exchange networks has documented purely 
structural effects of such power on action in negotiated exchange (Cook et al., 1983; Markovsky, 
Wilier, & Patton, 1988) by revealing that the effects of such power conditions are not contingent 
on an actor's awareness of the network-based power. The action produced by structural power, 
however, can alter the context for future negotiations, and this is our point of departure. 
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 Structural power establishes the contextual conditions for negotiations between some 
pairs of actors in a network by providing incentives for them to negotiate repeatedly and to arrive 
at satisfactory agreements. The incentives are that the focal relation is likely to provide greater 
benefit (expected value) to each actor than is the relation with his or her respective alternative 
negotiation partner. We take such power and incentive conditions as a given and ask what 
happens to the resulting exchange relation. We argue that if people act on these power conditions 
and repeatedly negotiate satisfactory agreements with each other, they will develop an 
emotional/affective commitment to their relationship that, in turn, changes the context for future 
negotiations. Behaviorally, emotional/affective commitment should be manifest in a propensity 
(a) to give each other benefits without strings attached (e.g., gifts), (b) to stay in their relationship 
even if the expected payoff from an alternative actor becomes equal to or better than that of the 
focal relation, and (c) to invest in a joint venture that takes the form of a social dilemma. We 
propose a theory that treats mild, everyday emotions as mediators of such commitment behavior, 
making endogenous emotional processes in the dyad an integral part of the explanation for 
emergent commitment formation. 
 Theory and research on a focal dyad embedded in a larger network, though decidedly 
micro in emphasis, could have important broader implications for the role of "pivotal dyads” in 
organizations, that is, dyadic relations among persons at key junctures in the organizational 
structure. Negotiations between pairs of actors who represent different parts of the organization 
are often critical to "fill in the gaps” between or to bridge institutional and technical levels, 
organizational policies and everyday practices, or conflicting external pressures that have 
different impacts on subparts of the organization. These negotiations are especially important 
where institutionalized rules and procedures do not offer ready-made solutions to the varied 
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problems that confront actors representing different subunits in the organization (e.g., union and 
management, marketing and finance), and where there are incentives for two particular persons 
to deal with these matters repeatedly over time. In the course of responding to such problems, 
one-on-one negotiations between key actors may even change institutional patterns—that is, 
taken-for-granted ways of doing things. 
 This chapter focuses in the abstract on when and how repeated negotiations between the 
same actors foster positive feelings or emotions and, in turn, an affective commitment to their 
relationship. However, we have in mind applications to pivotal dyads within organizations and 
also to the emergence of "friction” or "stickiness” in market relations. Implicit in the idea that 
negotiations in pivotal dyads shape institutional patterns is the notion that repeated negotiations 
between the same two actors are likely to become more than instrumental ways for the particular 
actors to get work done. We suggest a simple process by which dyadic negotiations give rise to 
incipient affective commitments that make the relationship an expressive object of attachment in 
its own right. When such transformations occur, future negotiations are not just efforts to solve 
yet another concrete issue or problem that the particular actors face; they come to symbolize or 
express the existence of a positive, productive relationship. Commitments that have an 
emotional/affective component tend to make the exchange relation an objective reality with 
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The Role of Everyday Emotions in Negotiations 
 
 Social exchange theorists, like theorists of bargaining and negotiation, have relegated 
emotions to a subsidiary position. Behaviorism and cognitivism have been the dominant 
theoretical guides for explaining how aspects of the social context affect negotiation behavior 
and outcomes (e.g., Emerson, 1981; Neale & Bazerman, 1991). These emphases are 
understandable given the Zeitgeist of the larger disciplines of psychology, sociology, and 
organizational behavior. Emotions are soft, vague, elusive phenomena to theorize and research. 
Also, the pathways to making emotional processes more central to analyses of bargaining and 
negotiation are likely to have several potholes and unexpected twists and turns, because there are 
several fundamental unanswered questions about emotion as a phenomenon, including the 
distinctiveness—physiologically and psychologically—of different emotions, their 
involuntariness, and the interrelationship of cognition and emotion (e.g., Forgas, 1992; Izard, 
1977, 1992; Kemper, 1978; Lazarus, 1984; Zajonc, 1984). 
 However, this is an appropriate time to think more systematically about the role of 
emotions in negotiations. In the larger social psychological literature, there is a rapidly growing 
body of research on emotion with applications to phenomena such as social judgment, prosocial 
behavior, persuasion, identity, self-presentation, and affective group attachment, to mention just 
a few (see Forgas, 1992; Hochschild, 1983; Isen & Baron, 1991; Kemper, 1978; Lawler, 1992a; 
Smith-Lovin & Heise, 1988). One important feature of this literature is a rejection of the historic 
sharp distinction between cognition and emotion in favor of the view that the two are intertwined 
in a variety of important ways. A second important feature is a focus on mild, everyday 
emotions, feelings, or moods rather than on "hot” or extreme emotions such as fear and anger. 
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Feeling good or happy, feeling sad or unhappy, feeling excited or energized, feeling tired or 
unmotivated—all exemplify mild emotions we experience regularly in social contexts (see Isen, 
1987). Mild, everyday emotions can be a positive motivating force in or a subtle hindrance to 
successful negotiations. 
 Consider a few examples of the impact of emotion on phenomena of relevance to 
negotiation. In a review of affect in social judgment, Forgas (1992) makes the general point that 
positive emotion leads to more heuristic information processing. For example, Schwarz and 
associates have found that targets of a persuasive communication who are in a positive mood 
process the information received in less systematic ways than do targets who are in a neutral or 
mildly depressed mood (Schwarz & Bless, 1991; Schwarz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991; Schwarz & 
Clore, 1988). In a study of how mood affects subjective probability judgments, Wright and 
Bower (1992) found that positive moods produce higher subjective probabilities for positive 
consequences of a choice and lower for negative consequences; negative moods produce the 
opposite effects. Apparently, mood affects the positivity of what is retrieved from memory 
(mood-consistent retrieval). Finally, Isen and Daubman (1984) have shown that a mild positive 
mood increases the degree to which persons categorize as similar items (e.g., colors) that are 
only marginally similar or even dissimilar; and Kraiger, Billings, and Isen (1989) have 
demonstrated that positive emotion, generated independent of a task, fosters more satisfaction 
upon completion of the task, suggesting that reports of satisfaction are mood congruent. Overall, 
research shows that mild positive emotions generate more global and heuristic information 
processing, a tendency to group together objects or elements of the situation and to make mood-
congruent inferences about future events. These sorts of processes should occur on negotiation 
contexts as well, and should bear on the relationships that evolve in repeated negotiations. 
Structural Power and Emotional Processes        7 
 
 A few studies have examined the effects of emotion in negotiations. For example, 
Carnevale and Isen (1986) tested the hypothesis that positive emotion or mood would increase 
the degree to which actors in bargaining would find and arrive at better integrative solutions. The 
rationale for this hypothesis was that mild positive emotion leads people to view a situation more 
broadly and to attempt to pull together or interrelate more elements of it; that is, positive mood 
leads to more heuristic information processing. The researchers found that when subjects in a 
positive mood bargained face-to-face, they reached higher joint outcomes (more integrative 
solutions) and used fewer contentious tactics; both findings support their hypothesis. Kramer, 
Newton, and Pommerenke (1993) replicated these results and also found that people 
experiencing positive emotion are more optimistic about future negotiations. More generally, 
Isen's (1987) review of work on mild feelings or moods suggests that positive emotion promotes 
cooperation and helping of others. One can extrapolate from such effects and argue that mild 
positive emotions, regardless of their source, lead people in negotiations to see more similarity 
among themselves and to develop a "dual concern” about their own and others' payoffs or 
outcomes. An emergent dual concern maybe integral to commitment formation. 
 Clearly, there is a need for more research on how mild, everyday emotions and feelings 
come about in negotiations and what impact these have on negotiation tactics and on future 
negotiations in the case of ongoing exchanges. Our theory and research constitute a modest step 
in that direction. The following sections present a social exchange framework, incorporate some 
basic forms of everyday emotion, offer a theoretical model explaining the role of 
emotional/affective processes in negotiation, and summarize recent evidence on that role. 
Finally, we point to some broader implications for networks, group formation, and commitment 
in organizations. 
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A Social Exchange Framework 
 
Dimensions of Structural Power 
 
 Social exchange theory portrays all social relationships, not just negotiation ones, as 
having an instrumental foundation. People ostensibly form and remain in relationships of 
whatever sort as long as they receive individual rewards better than those available elsewhere 
(Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962; Homans, 1961; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). Richard Emerson (1962, 
1972, 1981), in his seminal theoretical work, has developed a comprehensive theory of power 
from these basic ideas and assumptions of exchange theory. He has formulated an explicitly 
structural theory of power in which power capabilities are based on the dependencies or 
interdependencies within a network of more than two actors. The concept of structural power 
communicates not only that power is conceived of as a potential but that it is grounded in a 
network of dyadic relations. Emerson's concept of power as dependence captures some of the 
important features of negotiation contexts. 
 In negotiations, structural power concerns the objective relations of dependence and 
interdependence of the two actors (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Emerson, 1981). The power of A 
is based on the dependence of B on A, and vice versa. The degree of dependence varies 
positively with the value actors ascribe to the outcomes, resources, or issues at stake, and 
negatively with the availability of such outcomes or resources from elsewhere (Bacharach & 
Lawler, 1981). This is a fairly standard rendition of Emerson's power dependence theory that 
also dovetails with the larger social exchange tradition (e.g., Blau, 1964; Thibaut & Kelley, 
1959). Thus in an exchange situation in which two parties, A and B, can provide rewards x and y 
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to each other, A's power over B is equal to B's dependence on A for x and B's power over A is 
equal to A's dependence on B for y. Each party's dependence in turn has a positive relation with 
the value of x and y to B and A, respectively, and a negative relation with the availability of x 
and y from alternatives. Like others who examine exchange networks (e.g., Cook et al., 1983; 
Cook & Yamagishi, 1992; Markovsky et al., 1988), we focus on the “alternatives” dimension of 
dependence and essentially assume that value is constant. 
 Implicitly, Emerson's theory treats power in “absolute” terms, because each actor's power 
is based only on the other's dependence and not on his or her own. Bacharach and Lawler (1981) 
develop this idea further and propose a nonzero-sum theory of power dependence (see also 
Lawler 1992b; Lawler & Ford, 1993). A non-zero-sum theory allows for variation in the total (or 
average) amount of power potential in an exchange relation, whereas a zero-sum conception 
assumes a fixed total. With a non-zero-sum conception, both the total power (or mutual 
dependence) and relative power (dependence difference) are important structural dimensions of 
the relation—thus an increase in the power of one does not necessarily imply a decrease in the 
power of the other. Both actors can experience an increase in power without a change in their 
relative power (see Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Lawler, 1992a; Lawler & Bacharach, 1987). We 
suggest that in combination these dimensions of power grasp in a simple and parsimonious way 
the fundamental underpinning of an exchange relation such as that found in dyadic negotiations. 
 The broader import of a non-zero-sum approach to power is illustrated in Kanter's (1977) 
analysis of “empowerment” in organizations. She shows, for example, that if middle managers 
are “empowered” by becoming more involved in strategic planning and other activities external 
to their subunits, their subordinates also are “empowered” by having greater discretion and 
autonomy over day-to-day activities. The power of both middle and lower managers may change 
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in the same direction. Tannenbaum (1968) makes a similar point, suggesting that if the 
participation of employees in organizational decision making increases, their “control” over 
managers is enhanced, but so is the managers' control over them. 
 
Repetitive Negotiations in Exchange Relations 
 
 Mutual (total) and relative dependence should have an important effect on negotiations 
and the development of an ongoing “exchange relation.” Previous research on one-shot 
negotiations shows that greater mutual or total dependence and more equal dependence increase 
the likelihood of an agreement (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Lawler, 1992b, 1993; Lawler & 
Bacharach, 1987). Mutual dependence reflects the opportunity costs of failing to reach 
agreement with a particular other, and relative dependence bears on the prospects of mutually 
satisfactory agreements (Lawler, 1992b). In repeated negotiations, the objective power 
dependence context that brings actors together to negotiate in the first place will bring them 
together time and time again to resolve problems through negotiation (see Cook & Whitmeyer, 
1992; Lawler & Yoon, 1993). 
 To infer or argue that stable structural-power conditions produce commitment in ongoing, 
repeated encounters is not a new idea. The classic position of Emerson's exchange theory takes 
the form of a simple causal chain in which structural power is linked to commitment through the 
frequency of exchange (Cook & Emerson, 1984), as portrayed in Figure 7.1.1 Frequent exchange 
among the same actors produces commitment by reducing uncertainty (Cook & Emerson, 1984) 
or increasing interpersonal attraction (Tallman, Gray, & Leik, 1991). Thus two additional 
intervening mechanisms ostensibly can explain the link of repetitive exchange and 
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commitment—the actors come to know each other better (uncertainty reduction) or they come to 
like each other more (interpersonal attraction). In both, the explanation for commitment 
formation is still that the rewards within the relationship are better than elsewhere—that is, 
people stay because it pays. 
 
 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
 
 
 Our approach recasts and elaborates the causal chain proposed by the classic social 
exchange model by incorporating the emotional/affective dimension of commitment suggested in 
theory and research on organizational commitment (Kanter, 1972; Lincoln & Kalleberg, 1985; 
Meyer, Allen, & Gellatly, 1990; Mowday, Porter, & Steers, 1982; Mueller, Wallace, & Price, 
1992). Whereas Emerson (1972, 1981) assumes that exchange relations are formed from 
repeated instrumental encounters, we go further by suggesting that, in the process, exchange 
relations become partly expressive owing to emotional processes endogenous to the dyadic 
negotiations (Lawler & Yoon, 1993; Lawler, Yoon, Baker, & Large, in press). Our analysis of 
this phenomenon is inspired by Homans's (1950) classic notion that frequent exchange among 
the same actors is sufficient to produce sentiment relations among them if two conditions are 
met: (a) They have alternative relations and (b) these are not likely to provide benefits as good as 
the focal ones. These conditions are integral to select dyads within most any network and are 
assumed as given by our theory.2 
 Our theory contends that under the conditions put forth by Homans, the 
emotional/affective consequences of "doing things jointly with others” warrant particular 
attention (see Lawler & Yoon, 1993, p. 467). If a network gets the same two people together to 
Structural Power and Emotional Processes        12 
 
do something jointly and they repeatedly accomplish their joint task, they are likely to feel good 
about this. Adapting Berger and Luckmann's (1967) ideas about "incipient institutionalization,” 
more frequent exchange therefore should lead actors to perceive themselves as linked and as 
constituting a "unit” somewhat distinct from other dyads or relations in the situation. This is 
tantamount to the "objectification” of the exchange relation (Berger & Luckmann, 1967), that is, 
the perception of it as an objective reality apart from the actors composing it. Once objectified, 
the relation is likely to be perceived as partly responsible for the positive emotion, and therefore 
it becomes somewhat expressive (Lawler, 1992b; Lawler & Yoon, 1993). Objectification can be 
construed as "psychological group formation,” in Tajfel and Turner's terms (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel 
& Turner, 1986; Turner, 1987), and "expressiveness” as an emotional result of perceived 
interdependence (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989; Kramer, 1991, 1993; Rabbie & 
Horowitz, 1988). 
 "Expressiveness” of the relation is different from the liking or interpersonal attraction of 
the actors for each other (Hogg & Turner, 1985; Lawler, 1992b; Markovsky & Lawler, 1994; 
Parsons, 1951). Both the other actor and the social relation can be distinct social objects for 
actors, just as the "generalized other” and specific others are distinct social objects in George 
Herbert Mead's (1934) theorizing and "the organization” is a distinct object of attachment in 
research on organizational commitment (Lincoln & Kalleberg, 1985; Meyer et al., 1990; 
Mowday et al., 1982; Price & Mueller, 1986). Thus instrumental exchange relations, created and 
maintained by structural-power conditions, can become distinct targets of affective attachment 
regardless of the interpersonal attraction between the particular actors. Hogg and Turner (1985) 
make a similar distinction and provide some supporting evidence for the idea that interpersonal 
liking is not sufficient to foster group formation.3 
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 Thus, compared with the standard exchange viewpoint, our theory inserts an intervening 
emotional/affective process between repetitive exchange (agreements) and commitment 
behavior. In this framework, uncertainty reduction and liking for the other stem from the 
emotional/affective consequences of reaching agreements, consequences that also make the 
relation a social object for actors and a potential target of attachment; these other interpretations 
are subsumed by the collective impact of the emotional/affective process. To examine this 
emotional process further in the context of an exchange relation, we now turn to some recent 
work on mild, everyday emotions or feelings. 
 
 





 We adopt an approach to emotion heavily informed by the circumplex model and some 
sociological theorizing about everyday emotions (Kemper, 1978, 1987; Larsen & Diener, 1992; 
Watson & Tellegen, 1985). The emotions produced by negotiations are treated as normal, mild 
feelings that we all feel in our daily lives and that we can generally report and describe with 
accuracy. Such emotions include, for example, mild sensations of feeling happy, unhappy, 
elated, sad, excited, bored, enthusiastic, and unenthusiastic. 
 An emotion is defined as a transitory positive or negative evaluative state that involves 
neurophysiological, neuromuscular, and often cognitive components (Izard, 1992). Given 
relatively little consensus in the psychological and sociological literatures on the meanings of 
obviously related terms such as mood, emotion, affect, and feeling, we adopt a simple framework 
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useful for our particular concerns. Following Kemper (1978) and Gordon (1981), we define 
emotion as a transitory feeling and affect as an enduring sentiment; emotions are relatively 
diffuse feelings emerging from negotiations, whereas affect is a sentiment attached to the relation 
as an object. We focus solely on normal, mild, self-reportable feelings and sentiments. Although 
this necessarily skirts many fundamental theoretical and empirical issues about emotion, such an 
approach to emotions and affect has been used with substantial success by Isen and her 
colleagues (Isen, 1987; Isen & Baron, 1991) and by those who work with the circumplex model 
(Larsen & Diener, 1992). 
 The circumplex approach to emotion identifies pleasure and arousal as the main 
dimensions of emotion (Larsen & Diener, 1992). Pleasure is most basic and the emotion treated 
by Isen and her colleagues; the arousal dimension has been a theoretical and empirical problem 
in the literature because of its diffuseness and its potential to take either negative or positive 
forms. Arousal has varied positive forms, one of the most important of which is what Izard terms 
"interest/excitement.” Interest/excitement is a distinct and separate positive emotion, defined as a 
motivating state of curiosity and fascination (Izard, 1992; MacDowell & Mandler, 1989). 
Interest/excitement is "feeling energized,” whereas pleasure is "feeling satisfied.” We focus on 
these two forms of positive emotion. 
 As Izard (1992) indicates, interest/excitement is anticipatory or oriented to future events 
and involves an "awareness of potential satisfaction” (see also Deci, 1980). Pleasure/satisfaction, 
narrowly construed, is oriented to the past, a response to outcomes already received rather than 
those anticipated or hoped for in the future. This implies a distinction between emotions that 
stem from "looking backward” and those that stem from "looking forward” (see Lawler & Yoon, 
1993). Such a distinction could help capture a fundamental aspect of social interaction in general 
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and negotiation in particular. Actors tend to look both backward and forward, to think about 
what has happened recently and what might come next, to orient themselves to the past and to 
the future. When negotiations occur in ongoing relations, the salience of and attention to past and 
future obviously increase (Axelrod, 1984), and actors more vigilantly monitor and interpret the 
meaning of past events and the prospects of positive future events. Thus treating 
pleasure/satisfaction and interest/excitement as basic, everyday emotions of particular 
importance to bargaining and negotiation makes considerable sense and could lead to important 
insights. 
 
The Theoretical Model 
 
 The theory takes the form of a theoretical (causal) model that specifies the series of 
indirect paths through which structural power fosters commitment behavior (Figure 7.3). There 
are two exogenous variables, representing the zero-sum (differential dependence) and non-zero-
sum (mutual dependence) dimensions of power. Totalpower or mutual dependence is the sum of 
each actor's absolute power over the other; relative power is the difference between the two 
actors' power. The first endogenous variable is the frequency of agreement across repetitive and 
independent instances of negotiation; the next is positive emotion, taking the form of mild, 
everyday feelings of pleasure/satisfaction or interest/excitement. Satisfactory agreements or 
exchanges ostensibly produce such emotion, with satisfactory defined as an agreement better 
than likely from the alternative partner. Given the structural-power conditions, it is reasonable to 
assume that conditions producing more agreements are also producing more satisfactory ones. 
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Insert Figure 3 Here 
 
 
 Objectification refers to actors' perceptions of being linked to one another and 
constituting a unit distinct from other potential or actual relations in the context (Lawler & Yoon, 
1993). Based on the work of Berger and Luckmann (1967), when relations become objects unto 
themselves, they become a "third force” impinging on actors (see also Markovsky & Lawler, 
1994; Parsons, 1951). Commitment is the tie of an individual to a collective social object, such as 
a relationship, group, or organization. Affective commitments are individual-to-group ties that 
are emotional or cathectic (Kanter, 1972), rather than instrumental. 
 In testing the theoretical model, indirect effects of power and repetitive agreements 
through positive emotion indicate affectively based commitments, whereas direct effects for 
power or agreements suggest instrumentally based commitments. The following subsections 
discuss each step or link in the theoretical model, moving from left to right. 
 
Structural Power and Repetitive Agreements 
 
 Total power (mutual dependence) is a primary facilitator of exchange because dyads 
containing greater mutual dependence entail more "relational cohesion,” that is, a structural push 
toward cooperative action (Emerson, 1972; Lawler & Yoon, 1993; Lawler et al., in press). A 
negotiation relation with greater total power provides each actor more flexibility to adapt to the 
vicissitudes of the other's behavior and to the larger network because such contexts entail a larger 
number and range of negotiated agreements that meet a "sufficiency” criterion. Mutual power or 
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dependence in negotiations reflects the extent to which an ongoing relationship is susceptible to 
disruption by misjudgment, miscalculation, or changes in the larger network. 
Research applying power dependence to negotiations has shown that greater total power makes 
agreement more likely in one-shot negotiations where parties are aware of each other's 
alternatives (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Lawler, 1992b; Lawler & Bacharach, 1987). In recent 
work on repeated negotiations (Lawler et al., in press), a similar effect was observed where 
actors know the nature of their own, but not the other's, alternative. This suggests a purely 
structural effect for total power, attributable to the conjoint effects of each person acting on his 
or her own power position without being aware of the other's. 
Turning to unequal power, the problem actors face shifts to what is a fair and reasonable 
agreement. The theory predicts that equal power will produce more frequent agreements than 
unequal power, despite the fact that more benefits accrue to both actors from agreement. It is 
well known that those with more power tend to argue for agreements that treat power as an 
appropriate input in an equity equation and that therefore favor themselves, whereas those with 
lower power argue for agreements that are equal (see, e.g., Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Hegtvedt 
& Cook, 1987; Komorita, 1984). Unequal power complicates the bargaining agenda by bringing 
the meaning and implication of the power difference under dispute. 
 Various studies of two-party bargaining have suggested that unequal power tends to 
produce fewer agreements or make conflict resolution more difficult (Lawler, 1992b; Lawler & 
Bacharach, 1987; Lawler, Ford, & Blegen, 1988). In a recent study of unequal power in a 
multiparty social dilemma situation, Mannix (1993) also found that larger groups with unequal 
(compared with equal) power produced more focus on individual gain and generated poorer 
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outcomes overall. It seems clear that unequal, compared with equal, power creates additional 
obstacles for actors in negotiations. 
 
Repetitive Agreements and Positive Emotion 
 
 Our theory predicts that more frequent agreements (exchange) between the same actors 
produce and crystallize mild positive emotions or feelings. These emotions may involve 
pleasure/satisfaction with agreements that have already been negotiated and/or 
interest/excitement about the prospects of future negotiations. The strength of each emotion 
should depend on the degree to which the context stimulates actors to attend more to the past or 
to the future of their negotiations with each other. Both the past and the future "cast shadows” 
over current negotiations, and one question not yet addressed by the theory is what conditions 
determine the relative size of these shadows. 
 As we indicated earlier, our argument is that people also feel good as a result of 
accomplishing joint tasks with other people. This means that doing something jointly with 
another produces positive feelings (e.g., an "emotional buzz”) beyond those generated by the 
instrumental rewards. The overall strength of the emotions, of course, will likely vary with the 
task and a number of other aspects of the situation, but, in general, more challenging tasks should 
produce stronger emotional buzz. Negotiation contexts are particularly challenging, because 
actors have conflicting interests (or believe they do) and typically face considerable uncertainty 
and ambiguity. Such situations induce "cognitive work.” For these reasons, the emotions actors 
experience as a result of their joint activity should be somewhat stronger, more salient, and more 
easily self-reportable than those they experience in many other types of social situations. More 
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important, actors should be prone to give these emotions larger meanings by making inferences 
about their relationship to the other. 
 
Positive Emotion, Objectification, and Commitment Behavior 
 
 The theory stipulates that positive emotions produced by negotiations, if repetitive or 
frequent, make the people involved perceive a relationship with one another. They become more 
aware of their interdependence, as manifest in the social structure, and as their perceptions of 
interdependence grow, so does their sense of having a relationship. This is comparable to the 
"psychological group formation” process specified by Rabbie and associates, who argue and 
show empirically that perceptions of interdependence are the key foundation for group formation 
(Rabbie & Horowitz, 1988; Rabbie, Schot, & Visser, 1989). The mild positive feelings 
engendered in negotiations should strengthen this group formation process in a dyad within a 
larger network by enhancing mutual perceptions of interdependence. 
 The emergence of the relation as a distinct object makes it a likely target for emotions to 
the degree that the relation is perceived as a cause of these feelings. Lawler (1992a) recently 
developed a general theory of affective attachments that suggests an explanation for the 
objectification-to-commitment links in the theory. If a relation or group provides actors a sense 
of control over their situation—in this case, the uncertainty of the negotiation context—then the 
relation or group is likely to be a target for the positive feeling produced in the relation or group. 
The result is stronger affective attachment to that relation or group (Lawler, 1992a) and a 
propensity to treat it as valuable in its own right or as an end in itself (i.e., as an expressive 
object). The theory of affective attachments (Lawler, 1993) identifies a general process by which 
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persons form affective ties to collectivities, whether a dyadic relation in a network, a small group 
in a larger organization, or an organization in a society. 
 Given the actors' interdependence, reaching agreement in negotiations should enhance 
each actor's sense of control over the uncertainty of the situation; and the fact that actors jointly 
accomplish agreements should lead them to credit their relationship, at least in part, for the sense 
of control and related positive feeling. Thus the relationship should take on intrinsic value, and 
the actors should be more willing to do things to nurture and maintain the relationship. 
Continuing to negotiate agreements with the same other maintains the sense of control and 
enables each actor to reproduce the positive feelings. 
 To summarize, there are two main parts to the theory that reflect the two sides of the 
context- action relationship. The first specifies how social contexts initiate commitment 
processes by generating repetitive agreements among the same actors. Social contexts with high 
total power and equal power produce the most frequent or repetitive agreements. This is the 
context-to-action aspect of the theory. The second part of the theory specifies an endogenous 
process through which repetitive agreements lead to commitment behavior. Repetitive agreement 
increases positive emotions in the form of mild pleasure/satisfaction and interest/excitement, and 
positive emotions in turn produce a perceived relationship that leads the actors to engage in 
behavior that contributes to the relationship. This is the action-to- context aspect of the theory, 
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Evidence for the Theory 
 
 We tested several key parts of the theoretical model in two recent studies (Lawler & 
Yoon, 1993; Lawler et al., in press). The first focused on the impact of equal versus unequal 
power, and the second on low versus high mutual dependence (total power). In both studies, two 
actors representing organizations negotiated over the price of a product, and each had one 
alternative. Negotiation with the alternative was likely to give a lower payoff than negotiation 
with the focal relation (i.e., it had a lower expected value). The actors engaged in explicit 
negotiations across 8 to 10 episodes of negotiation (which varied by study), with a maximum of 
5 rounds in each year. Each episode set the terms of an exchange for a year, and the negotiations 
started anew in the next year. 
 After several episodes (years) of negotiation, actors had the option to give each other 
unilateral gifts; this was the form of commitment behavior common across the two studies. 
Actors did not receive information on the number of gifts given by each other until the 
experiment was over (see Lawler & Yoon, 1993; Lawler et al., in press), so they could not 
implicitly negotiate reciprocal gifts.4 
 The results of these studies support some key parts of the theoretical model (Figure 7.3). 
As predicted, the impact of structural power on commitment was mediated by 
emotional/affective processes in both studies. In the first study, we found that equal, compared 
with unequal, power produced more commitment behavior, indirectly, through the emotional 
effects of more frequent agreements under equal power (Lawler & Yoon, 1993). In other words, 
equal power increased the frequency of agreement, which in turn increased positive emotion, 
which in turn increased commitment behavior (e.g., gift giving). It is important to note that at 
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each step, the direct effects of antecedent variables were nonexistent or relatively small. The 
second study revealed that greater mutual dependence produced more frequent agreements, 
which in turn produced more positive emotion and commitment behavior (Lawler et al., in 
press). Although neither study could test the role of objectification, the results were consistent 
with an "objectification-to-expressiveness” interpretation. Moreover, the second study showed 
that higher mutual dependence produced perceptions of a closer relationship on a 
postexperimental questionnaire, and that this effect was mediated by the frequency of agreement. 
In sum, initial evidence supports the theoretical model displayed in Figure 7.3. 
 The evidence also suggests that the forward-looking emotion, interest/ excitement, may 
have more to do with the commitment process than the backward-looking emotion, 
pleasure/satisfaction. We found that the impact of repetitive agreements on commitment 
behavior was mediated by interest/excitement rather than pleasure/satisfaction; the degree of 
pleasure/satisfaction was determined primarily by the payoffs from actual (past) agreements 
(Lawler & Yoon, 1993). Pleasure/satisfaction maybe a function of the nature of agreement, 
whereas interest/excitement is a function of the frequency of agreement. More frequent 
agreements may yield hope and an expectation of better things to come, which could account for 
a greater impact on affectively based commitments (for more discussion, see Lawler & Yoon, 
1993). This interpretation is made more plausible by the fact that some research on 
organizational commitment similarly indicates that interesting and challenging work has a 
stronger impact on organizational commitment than tangible rewards, such as pay, fringe 
benefits, promotions, and security (see Mottaz, 1988). Clearly, pleasure/satisfaction and 
interest/excitement are not mutually exclusive emotional responses, and future work should 
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determine whether and when these backward-looking and forward-looking emotions have 
different effects on commitment formation. 
 
Some Broader Implications 
 
 We interpret the development of commitment in a relationship within a network as a 
"group formation” process driven by the positive feelings of pleasure/satisfaction or 
interest/excitement that result from solving problems (reaching agreements) with the same other 
over time. Positive emotions are individual-level phenomena that make salient to actors their 
interdependence and common fate, a key condition for group formation (Brewer & Kramer, 
1986; Kramer, 1991, 1993; Kramer & Brewer, 1984; Rabbie & Horowitz, 1988; Rabbie et al., 
1989). If group formation is a result of perceptions of interdependence (Kramer, 1991, 1993; 
Kramer & Brewer, 1984; Rabbie & Horwitz, 1988) rather than the mere sharing of a social 
category (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), it becomes important to integrate power dependence theory 
with extant notions about group formation. The two dimensions of power dependence, relative 
and total power, are social-structural conditions that should foster incipient perceptions of 
interdependence at the outset, but then shape and solidify them by virtue of the interactions these 
power conditions produce in the actual negotiations. Our theory of commitment offers an 
emotional/affective explanation for such group formation that reaches beyond the cognitive 
accounts of previous work. The general processes suggested by our theory also should apply 
beyond the dyadic relations that are of primary concern in this chapter. We next consider some 
implications for networks, transaction-costs economics, and organizational commitment. 
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 Applied to networks, the process of group formation in dyadic negotiations poses a 
dilemma. In networks of exchange, such as those studied by Cook and associates (Cook & 
Emerson, 1978; Cook et al., 1983) and Markovsky and associates (Markovsky et al., 1988; 
Wilier, Markovsky, & Patton, 1989), dyadic negotiations among the same pairs of actors over 
time should create pockets of “relational cohesion” that satisfy individual actors but also 
fragment the network. Over time, ties within a subset of dyads become stronger and more 
resilient, whereas ties in other potential or actual relations become weaker to nonexistent or 
virtually impossible. Such processes are readily visible in almost any organization, as people 
come and go and relations strengthen and weaken accordingly. If our theory is correct, structural 
theories of exchange cannot account for the ebb and flow of relational strength. Endogenous 
emotional processes will make some dyads more resilient and less vulnerable to changes of the 
larger network than structural theories would predict, even with the addition of strategic and 
cognitive principles. 
 Applied to transaction-costs economics (Williamson, 1975, 1981), our theory shows how 
exchange relations can become objects of intrinsic value in their own right, or ends in 
themselves. The emergence of the relationship as a positive object can be construed as an 
incipient “governance” structure or a form of “internal organization” that responds to the 
uncertainty of the negotiation setting (bounded rationality condition), the options both actors 
have to go elsewhere at any time (potential for opportunism), and the small number of exchanges 
involved (small-numbers bargaining). The important point of our theory is that the mere 
frequency of exchange is sufficient to unleash a commitment process, and the resulting 
“relational cohesion” is based on the emotional/affective consequences of such frequent 
exchange. Commitment, in our theory, signifies the development of relationship-specific assets 
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that enhance the social costs of exchanging with alternative partners. Asset specificity with such 
an emotional foundation should have an even more pronounced effect on contracting than 
predicted by Williamson (1981). 
 Commitments developed as our theory predicts would involve strong ties between the 
actors. In organizations, such strong ties can be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, strong 
ties between key actors are likely to help get the work of the organization done; in fact, as long 
as actors maintain a focus on organizational tasks, such ties should improve efficiency and 
performance. Our theory implicitly highlights the importance of one-on-one relations to getting 
things done. On the other hand, the fragmenting effects of pockets of “relational cohesion” are a 
problem if these become vehicles of opposition to organizational goals and procedures. Those 
with strong personal ties may provide each other mutual affirmation and support for action that 
reduces organizational performance and efficiency. Network theories offer a possible solution: If 
weak ties are maintained among dyads with strong ties, the contribution of strong ties to getting 
the work done may proceed without excessive insulation, and the weak ties (see Granovetter, 
1973) may provide informal “oversight” for each of the pivotal or key dyads. This is one way 
that networks may be a viable alternative to both markets and hierarchies as a method of 
organizing dyadic transactions (Powell, 1990). 
 One overall result of dyadic relations with strong expressive links within them and weak 
instrumental links between them could be more widespread “organizational citizenship” 
behavior—that is, a tendency to do such things as taking on additional organizational tasks 
voluntarily, without compensation (Bateman & Organ, 1983; Organ, 1990). Such “citizenship” 
in an organizational member could be motivated by a strong tie with another with whom the 
member works repeatedly on organizational tasks rather than loyalty to the organization per se, 
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but it may appear to be “organizational” because of the coordination induced by weak ties to 
others in the organization. Some organizational citizenship behavior may in fact be “relational 
citizenship behavior.” 
 If one accepts this network imagery for viewing dyadic negotiations, it also is reasonable 
to suggest that organizational commitments are mediated in part by the formation of expressive 
relations among actors, something that organizations often attempt to prevent. If such relations 
emerge from instrumental ones fostered by the organizational structure and remain focused on 
the joint activity involved in getting the work of the organization done, they can be quite helpful 
to organizations. Homans's (1961) classic analysis of 10 cash posters working at a utility 
company illustrates the organizational benefits of expressive relations in the workplace. The cash 
posters' duty was to record customers' payments on ledger cards at the time of receipt. The 
company's standard was 300 postings per hour, and detailed records of the speed of work were 
kept. Homans observed that the employees significantly exceeded the standard, even though pay 
was not yoked to production, promotions were rare, and working below the standard resulted in 
only a "mild rebuke” from the supervisor. Over time, faster workers did not reduce their speed to 
the standard, and the company did not raise the standard to fit the faster workers' speed. Homans 
argues that it was not salary, promotion, or other extrinsic benefits that produced the additional 
production of the workers, but the positive sentiment that developed among the workers and 
between the workers and the larger organization. One interpretation is that affectively based 
commitments to the organization developed in part from the frequent positive interaction of the 
cash posters with each other and the mutual sharing of positive experiences with the larger 
organization. Although there are certainly other interpretations for Homans's observations (see, 
e.g., Kelley, 1979), this example at least serves to suggest how affectively based commitments to 
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relations and groups in the workplace might be relevant to organizational commitment (see also 




 In this chapter we have put forth and modified the classic social exchange approach to 
power and commitment behavior. The classic view is that structural power produces 
commitments by laying the foundation for repetitive exchange among the same actors. Our 
theory elaborates this process by arguing that repetitive exchange arouses positive feelings that 
are attributed to the relation. This introduces an emotional/affective component to the 
commitment process. Whereas exchange theory can explain only instrumental forms of 
commitment, our theory explains how and why affective commitments to an exchange relation 
can develop and thereby transform an instrumental exchange relation to an expressive relation. 
 Emotional processes, in our view, forge a link between the existing social context and 
subsequent changes in that social context. The initial push toward change is embedded in the 
structural power and associated potentials and tendencies in the social context. People respond to 
the context with behaviors that produce emotions at the individual level; these individual 
emotions change how people perceive their relationships to one another, strengthening in 
particular their sense of interdependence. This makes the relation a salient "social object” and a 
target of affective commitment, which is manifest in stay behavior, a propensity to give things to 
each other without strings attached, and an inclination to contribute to a joint venture (i.e., a 
public good). 
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 In a larger sense, the reciprocal connections of context and behavior involve macro-to-
micro effects (structure to action) and subsequent micro-to-macro effects (action to structure). 
Neither set of effects can be subsumed under the other; both are essential to understanding the 
role of context in negotiations. Applying a recently published framework for micro-macro 
linkages (see Lawler, Ridgeway, & Markovsky, 1993), negotiations involve encounters that are 
produced by a macro structure (the minimal network, in this case). In these encounters, actors 
are purposive (have instrumental goals) and are responsive to each other (take account of each 
other). Their interaction produces a micro structure, which takes the form of a dyadic relation 
that is viewed and treated by the actors and others as an objective reality or unit unto itself. This 
relationship, once developed, shapes the actors' future encounters with each other but also limits 
their encounters with others in the larger network. Thus the connections among structurally 
based power, repetitive exchange, and commitment formation in dyadic negotiation relationships 
reflect an intertwining of micro-to-macro and macro-to-micro processes. 
  




1. An assumption of interdependent actors who engage in repetitive exchange helps 
distinguish exchange theory from neoclassical economic theory (Emerson, 1972, 1981), which 
assumes a frictionless market and focuses exclusively on discrete and interchangeable 
transactions. In the classical market, a buyer and a seller will not enter into repeated transactions 
with each other unless the price is the best each time, and if this occurs, repetitive exchanges will 
not have any effects per se. Social exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962, 1972; Homans, 
1961; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) contends that repetitive transactions engender social effects that 
cannot be explained by economic theory and require a social-structural explanation (Emerson, 
1981). 
2. We analyze the frequency of agreement in repeated negotiations and take for granted that 
negotiated exchange will not occur with much frequency in focal relations unless those relations 
are perceived as providing more benefits than alternative relations. Suboptimal agreements are 
enough to produce an emotional/affective commitment process as long as the agreements yield 
payoffs greater than the expected value of the alternative. 
3. The transformation of instrumental exchange or negotiation into an expressive relation 
does not imply that the original instrumental foundation of the relationship has disappeared, only 
that expressiveness has been superimposed on the instrumental base. In markets, expressive 
relations are an emotional/affective form of stickiness or friction. 
4. Gift giving is defined by actors as a unilateral, noncontingent benefit from a different 
value domain than that under negotiation (Ekeh, 1974; Heath, 1975; Lawler 8t Yoon, 1993). 
Gifts are often small, token gestures such as "showing interest” in new employees, volunteering 
to help a friend with a difficult task, or putting extra effort into a collective task (Lawler 8t Yoon, 
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1993, p. 486). Various "organizational citizenship behaviors” essentially represent gift giving of 
this sort (see Bateman & Organ, 1983; Organ, 1990). Organ (1990) defines organizational 
citizenship as "organizationally beneficial behaviors and symbolic gestures that can neither be 
enforced on the basis of formal role obligations nor elicited by contractual guarantee of 
recompense” (p. 46). Included are constructive statements about a department, expression of 
personal interest in the work of others, and suggestions for improvement. 
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